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DEFECTIVE COMPUTER-AIDED DESIGN SOFTWARE 
LIABILITY IN 3D BIOPRINTED HUMAN ORGAN 
EQUIVALENTS 
By Jamil Ammar † 
Three-dimensional (3D) bioprinting offers the exciting prospect 
of printing 3D multicellular human organs by combining a host of 
specialisms, including software development, biotechnology and tort 
law. 3D bioprinting methods rely on highly specialized computer 
software that incorporates computer-aided design (CAD). Optimizing 
development of CAD software is paramount to the quality of the final 
bioprinted organ. This optimization is computationally intensive, and 
its success plays a critical role in regulating key aspects of the final 
bioprinted organ, such as mechanical and cell growth properties of the 
scaffold, behavior, and cell differentiation.    
Policies underlying strict product liability law are highly relevant 
to ‘defective’ CAD software. Given the potentially life threatening 
impact of defective software, this article proposes that the U.S. rethinks 
its approach to liability of such defective software. This article 
proposes a policy-based approach that could be adapted to determine 
which aspects of the manufacturing process of a bioprinted human 
organ justify the added consumer protection provided by strict product 
liability. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
Three-dimensional (3D) bioprinting is an emerging industry that 
offers the exciting prospect of printing, in 3D, multicellular human 
organ equivalents (organ equivalent devices or ‘OEDs’) for use in a 
clinical disease setting.1 Such 3D bioprinting methods rely on 
computer-aided design (CAD) and computer aided manufacturing 
(CAM) in order to design, and manufacture OEDs. First, specialized 
executable CAD software must be created by the CAD developer. This 
CAD software is then used by the ‘CAD user’ to create a bespoke 
(patient-specific) 3D CAD model of the patient’s organ that can be 
used for bioprinting (the ‘CAD print file’); this CAD print file is 
typically derived from 3D image data obtained from methods such as 
computed tomography (CT) or magnetic resonance imaging (MRI).2 
                                                            
1 Sean Murphy & Anthony Atala, 3D Bioprinting of Tissues and Organs, 32 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 773 (2014). 
2 Wei Sun, Binil Starly, Jae Nam & Andrew Darling, Bio-CAD modeling and its applications in 
computer-aided tissue engineering, 37 COMPUTER-AIDED DESIGN 1097 (2005).  
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The creation of the CAD print file presents two key technical 
challenges: (i) replication of intricate organ micro-architecture and (ii) 
organization of multiple cell types at a resolution that is sufficient to 
manufacture a fully functional organ.3 A typical human organ consists 
of multiple cell types, including specific functional, structural, and 
supportive cells.4 Finally, the CAD print file is used to manufacture the 
final OED using bioprinting methods. 
Creating the optimum CAD print file is paramount to successful 
OED bioprinting, since the design of that file plays a key role in 
determining the mechanical properties of the OED’s cell scaffold (the 
structure providing support to 3D bio-printed cells to multiply), cell 
growth, cell dynamics and differentiation.5 The final use of the CAD 
software, via the CAD print file, therefore, has an indisputably specific 
set of characteristics that must be taken into account when assessing 
the concept of liability during CAD software design and development. 
While offering enormous benefits, methods of CAD software 
development may carry generic risks for which liability rests with the 
developer.6 This is particularly significant for OED manufactures, 
since OED quality relies heavily, albeit not exclusively, on CAD 
software quality. 
In the medical 3D bioprinting field, three theories are, in principle, 
relevant to the protection of the patient against injuries that are 
attributable to defective CAD software: (i) medical malpractice (a 
subset of negligence law),7 (ii) breach of warranty under the Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC),8 and (iii) strict liability. None of these 
theories, however, adequately address the range of injuries that could 
potentially arise due to use of defective CAD software. This article will 
explore these issues in the framework of the ongoing conflict between 
negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability. In this context, 3D 
bioprinting creates the possibility of extending theories of liability; 
redefining the parameters of tort liability where healthcare providers 
                                                            
3 Murphy & Atala, supra note 1, at 773-85.  
4 Murphy & Atala, supra note 1, at 780. 
5 Dong-Woo Cho, Jung-Seob Lee, Jinah Jang, et. al., ORGAN PRINTING 5-2 (Morgan & Claypool 
Publishers) (2015). 
6 Broadly speaking, absent a consensual agreement to the contrary, the manufacturer of a given 
product, including medical devices, is liable for its quality, reliability and safety and thus might 
be held accountable for any resulting damages. 
7 Malpractice is a type of negligence occurs when a licensed professional (like a doctor, lawyer 
or accountant) fails to provide services as per the standards set by the governing body (‘standard 
of care’). Negligence is a failure to exercise the care that a reasonably prudent person would 
exercise in like circumstances. It applies to harm caused by carelessness, not intentional harm. 
8 See e.g., Motorola Mobility, Inc. v. Myriad France SAS, 850 F. Supp. 2d 878 (N.D. III. 2012) 
(alleging defective software pleaded as a breach of warranty). 
40 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.  [Vol. 35 
provide both semi-traditional manufacturing and healthcare services. 
The definitions of software developer, fabricator, or manufacturer 
(rather than healthcare provider), and, equally important for our 
discussion here, the products versus services dichotomy, will be 
scrutinized. 
From the perspective of product liability, courts in the U.S. 
consider computer software to be a service rather than a product. To 
date, courts have been reluctant to extend theories of product liability 
to software.9 In the same context, the near-unanimous common wisdom 
and current holding of courts is that the primary function of hospitals 
and other healthcare providers is to provide services rather than to sell 
products.10 This creates a technical dichotomy that to date has created 
an immunity for healthcare providers and medical professionals against 
strict liability claims for the effects of products used ‘incidentally’ in 
the provision of healthcare. The manufacturers of those products, 
however, may still be subject to strict liability law. 
Product liability is a critical policy issue in the field of 3D 
bioprinting. It is necessary to reconsider the premise that software 
developers, especially in a healthcare setting, are not intrinsically 
subject to strict liability rules in relation to the software they provide. 
Such an extensive immunity, while justified in a conventional health 
care setting, is poorly-suited to the 3D bioprinting age for which 
software errors can cause actual physical injury to patients. Liability 
regimes currently consist of a collection of different legal systems that 
do not properly fit the needs of OED manufactures due to the fact that 
OED bioprinting combines both products and services.11 Healthcare 
professionals, medical device manufacturers, and medical software 
developers have, traditionally, been clearly separated; this is no longer 
the case, particularly when OED design and bioprinting are carried out 
by the same entity.  
                                                            
9 See generally, ClearCorrectOperating, LLC v. Inter’l Trade Comm’n, 810 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 
2015); Sanders v. Acclaim Entm’t, 188 F.Supp. 2d 1264 ( D. Colo. 2002)(“holding that computer 
games are not products for strict liability purposes”); Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc., 198 
F.Supp.2d 167, 173 (D. Conn. 2002)(indicating that interactive “virtual reality technology” is not 
a “[product] for the purposes of strict products liability”); James v. Meow Media, Inc., 90 F.Supp. 
2d 798, 810 (W.D. Ky. 2000) (stating that “[w]hile computer source codes and programs are 
construed as ‘tangible property’ for tax purposes and as ‘goods’ for UCC purposes, these 
classifications do not indicate that intangible thoughts, ideas, and messages contained in computer 
video games, movies, or internet materials should be treated as products for purposes of strict 
liability”), aff’d, 300 F.3d 683, 700–01 (6th Cir. 2002) (software makers and website operators 
did not deal in “products”).  
10 Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital, 123 N. E. 2d 792, 795 (N.Y. 1954) (arguing that medical 
care provider provides patients with services not goods). 
11 Murphy, supra note 1. 
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The significance of CAD software to the bioprinting process 
originates from three notable characteristics. First, unlike the case of 
electronic and mechanical assemblies, software failures always arise 
due to development or engineering defects.12 Second, a software-based 
medical device is generally more complicated and technically 
demanding than software used to produce other conventional 
electronics. The overwhelming majority of ‘conventional’ software 
cannot be fully tested for every combination of potential pathway 
through the software source code.13 It follows that not all 3D 
bioprinting software defects can be fully tested for every combination 
of potential pathways through the software source code either; this has 
potentially far-reaching significance given the importance of CAD 
software in determining the quality of the final bioprinted OED. 
Thirdly, from a welfare standpoint, apart from the potential costs of 
human harm or even death, it is considerably cheaper to correct 
software defects early rather than late in the development lifecycle.14 
Using this welfare argument, it can be argued that strict liability could 
be extended to aspects of CAD development given the fact that the 
CAD developer is in a strong position to discourage the development 
of defective software through arguments of cost-effectiveness.  
In this context, one should ask how the law should treat suits 
brought by victims of defective CAD software in the field of OED 
manufacturing. In this article, we shall look for liability on the part of 
two potential defendants: (i) healthcare providers that use CAD print 
files, both organizing and controlling the bioprinting processes within 
their premises (CAD users), and (ii) non-manufacturing developers of 
CAD print files (a CAD developer who produces an executable CAD 
program but does not herself use the CAD program to create OEDs or 
files to print OEDs).  
The main article will be structured as follows. First, we will 
discuss how and why the OED bioprinting industry presents serious 
legal and technical challenges in the fields of professional and product 
liability, especially regarding defective CAD development. We will 
then investigate the possibility of extending liability for defective CAD 
software to manufacturing and non-manufacturing healthcare 
providers; here we will highlight the need to clearly set out the general 
obligations of the CAD developer, alongside the obligations of the 
healthcare providers that use the CAD software during OED 
                                                            
12 David Vogel, MEDICAL DEVICE SOFTWARE VERIFICATION, VALIDATION, AND COMPLIANCE 27 
(Artech House, 2011).   
13 See generally, Id., at 27.   
14 Id. at 34.   
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manufacturing. These discussions will be guided by the hypothesis that 
the majority of relevant regulations and guidance documents have been 
developed with conventional medical devices firmly in mind.15 We will 
conclude by suggesting a promising approach for addressing the 
liability challenge in the context of defective software development.  
I. REGULATORY REGIMES FOR 3D BIOPRINTING OF OEDS: A 
BRIEF INTRODUCTION  
There is not currently a set of specific regulations that adequately 
meet the quality, safety and efficacy requirements of OED 
manufacturing. Depending on how a manufactured OED is ultimately 
characterized, the OED itself falls under a vast body of law, 
regulations, and guiding documents, none of which adequately covers 
the liability issues that might arise from use of defective CAD software. 
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) draft guidance titled 
“Technical Considerations for Additive Manufactured Devices”, as an 
example,16 clearly states that it does not address the use or 
“incorporation of biological, cellular, or tissue-based products in AM 
(additive manufacturing).”17 Here, it is useful to keep in mind that a 3D 
bioprinted OED is an implantable surgically invasive medical body 
part equivalent; in other words, OEDs are intended to be surgically 
introduced into the human body. Therefore, OEDs must be ‘designed’ 
and bioprinted (manufactured) in such a way that, when implanted 
under suitable conditions and for the defined purpose, they do not 
compromise the clinical condition or safety of the patient. 
                                                            
15 None of the currently applicable regulations and guidance documents apply to 3D bio-printing 
of human organs. Examples include, The Technical Considerations for Additive Manufactured 
Devices: Draft Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Administration Staff, U.S. DEP'T 
HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES (May 10,2016). Page 2 explicitly excluded manufactured tissues and 
organs. The Recital 13 of Regulation 2017/745 of the European Parliament (April 5, 2017) also 
excludes products containing viable tissues or cells of human or animals origin from the scope of 
this Regulation. Recital 8 and Article 2 (c) exclude human organs from the scope of Directive 
2004/23/EC on setting standards of quality and safety for the donation, procurement, testing, 
processing, preservation, storage and distribution of human tissues and cells, (OJ) L. 102/48 
7.4.2004 (2004).   
16 Technical Considerations for Additive Manufactured Devices: Draft Guidance for Industry and 
Food and Drug Administration Staff, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES 
(May 10,2016), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/gu
idancedocuments/ucm499809.pdf. 
17 Id. at 2. See also, Regulatory Considerations for Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and 
Tissue Based Products: Minimal Manipulation and Homologous Use, Guidance for Industry 
and Food and Drug Administration Staff, FDA (2017), 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/biologicsbloodvaccines/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformat
ion/guidances/cellularandgenetherapy/ucm585403.pdf.   
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Based on the risks that OEDs present, the current regulatory 
regime in the U.S. establishes various levels of oversight for 
‘conventional’ and 3D printed medical devices. Devices that are 
purported or represented to be used in “supporting or sustaining human 
life or for a use which is of substantial importance in preventing 
impairment of human health,” (Class III) or that present a “potential 
unreasonable risk of illness or injury” are subject to the most rigorous 
testing process and federal oversight.18 A manufacturer of a Class III 
device must submit what is typically a multivolume application that 
includes, among other things, full reports of all studies and 
investigations of the device’s safety and effectiveness; these studies 
should have been published or should reasonably be known to the 
applicant. Among other requirements, the applicant must also provide 
a ‘full statement’ of the device’s “components, ingredients, and 
properties and of the principle or principles of operations.”19 Only once 
the device’s safety and effectiveness are reasonably assured is it 
possible to grant approval.20 The FDA must “weig[h] any probable 
benefit to health from the use of the device against any probable risk of 
injury or illness from such use.”21  
In summary, the result of this regulation is that the FDA can 
approve a device that presents significant risk as long as it also offers 
sufficient patient benefit in the context of available alternatives.22 Class 
III devices are subject to reporting requirements.23 Thus, any new 
clinical or scientific studies concerning the device that the applicant is 
aware of or should reasonably be aware of, as well as incidents in which 
the device may have caused or contributed to death or serious injury, 
or malfunctioned in a manner that would likely cause or contribute to 
death or serious injury if it recurred, must all be reported to the FDA.24  
Broadly speaking, satisfying the safety criterion is a matter of risk-
benefit analysis; effective medical devices are rarely risk-free. The 
FDA, which is responsible for protecting the public health by assuring 
the safety, efficacy, and security of biological products, employs two 
                                                            
18 Examples include replacement heart valves, implanted cerebella stimulators, and pacemaker 
pulse generators; Classification of Devices Intended for Human Use, 21 U.S.C § 360c (2017). 
19 21 U.S.C § 360e(c)(1)(B) (2017).  
20 21 U.S.C § 360e(d)(2) (2017).  
21 21 U.S.C § 360c(a)(2)(C) (2017). 
22 For example, the FDA approved a ventricular assist device for children with failing hearts, even 
though the survival rate of children using the device was less than 50 percent. See  FDA, CENTER 
FOR DEVICES AND RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, Debakey VAD Child Left Ventricular Assist System-
H030003, Summary of Safety and Probable Benefit 20 (2004), http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/ 
pdf3/H030003b.pdf. 
23 21 U.S.C § 360i (2017). 
24 21 C.F.R § 814.84(b)(2) (2013), 
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specific regulatory tools: (i) the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 
(as amended), and (ii) Regulation 21 CFR (800-1299). Of particular 
significance to our discussion is Part 820 of the Code (Quality System 
Regulations).25 In the U.S., Section 351 of the Public Health Act and 
Title 21, Part 1271 of the CFR (Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and 
Tissue-Based Products) are also relevant. The latter regulates stem cell-
based medical devices (often referred to as somatic cell therapies or 
biologics).26 Other voluntary initiatives are also utilized, including 
FDA guidelines, industry standards and information reports. 
A device that is manufactured from or that incorporates human 
tissues is typically regulated as a human cell, tissue, or cellular- or 
tissue-based product (HCT) under 21 CFR Parts 1270 and 1271.27 Both 
Parts require tissue establishments to, among other things, test donors 
and prepare and follow written procedures for the prevention of the 
spread of disease. 28 It should be noted that vascularized human organ 
transplants, such as kidney, liver, and heart transplants, are not 
regulated under this part; instead, transplantations are overseen by the 
Health Resources Services Administration (HRSA). 29 It is yet to be 
decided if OEDs will be classified as tissue-based products. In the 
meantime, this vast body of law, regulations and guiding documents 
are, at best, partially applied.  
 
A. Intersection between Traditional Tort Liability and CAD 
Software 
 
Here we will survey the U.S. legal framework for software 
development liability. Our goal is not to provide an exhaustive review 
of the minutiae of black letter liability law, but rather to identify the 
building blocks for moving forward. U.S. tort liability laws consist of 
a conglomeration of legal regimes that include negligence, strict 
liability or a combination of the two.30 Negligence is a fault-based 
system whereby a customer who has suffered loss or damage resulting 
                                                            
25 21 C.F.R § 820.30 (2019) applies to medical device software professionals. 21 C.F.R §§ 820.30, 
820.70 are Design Control Regulations (regulating how a medical device, designed, developed, 
reviewed,  tested, and documented). Section 820.70 regulates production and process controls. 21 
C.F.R § 820.70 (2019). 
26 21 C.F.R § 1271.10 (2014).  
27 Examples include, bone, skin, corneas, heart valves, and hematopoietic stem/progenitor cells 
derived from peripheral all fall under this category.U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, 
Tissue & Tissue Products (2018), 
https://www.fda.gov/biologicsbloodvaccines/tissuetissueproducts/default.htm. 
28 Id. 
29 Id.  
30 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 281-503 (1934); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 504-24 (1938). 
2019] Defective Computer-Aided Design Software   45 
from defective software can bring an action in negligence against the 
software developer;31 defective software development typically falls 
under this broad category. This common form of legal action will be 
discussed briefly later. In contrast, the strict liability doctrine is based 
on the notion that a manufacturer is liable for product defects, 
regardless of fault.32 For reasons that will become clear shortly, neither 
strict liability nor negligence regimes can be applied adequately to 
software development in the field of OED manufacturing. Here, we 
will solely examine the possibility of extending the liability of the CAD 
developer under the uncommon strict liability path. In this context, 3D 
bioprinting methods create a number of liability-related challenges that 
are yet to be addressed.  
In the U.S., common-law strict liability standards rely on either 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts33 or Restatement (Third) of Torts.34 
Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the task of establishing a 
product defect includes an analysis of consumer expectation, risk 
utility, and manufacturing quality.35 In contrast, the test to determine 
whether a product is defective under Restatement (Third) of Torts 
raises three interrelated sources of defect: (i) manufacturing defects, 
(ii) development defects, and (iii) defects related to inadequate user 
instructions or warnings.36 A key point to note here is that integrating 
different components into a product might introduce certain dangers 
for which liability rests with the patient. Provided that the supplied 
components are not defective and the component supplier has not 
participated in the product design, the component supplier is normally 
under no duty to warn end-users of any dangers in the product in which 
their components are incorporated.37 In all cases, strict liability does 
not apply unless the said defective product was sold by a person or 
entity engaged in the ‘business of selling’.38 Manufacturers, 
wholesalers, retailers, and distributors are all considered to be involved 
                                                            
31 This common form of legal action will be briefly addressed here. 
32 David Owen & Mary Davis, PRODUCTS LIABILITY §5:29 (4th ed. 2016). 
33 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A (Am. Law inst.1965). 
34 Patrick Comerford & Erik Belt, 3DP, AM, 3DS and Product Liability, 55 SANTA CLARA L.REV. 
821, 825-30, 832, 835- 36 (2015). 
35 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A reads: “(1) One who sells any product in a defective 
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability 
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the 
seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach 
the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold”. 
36 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY. § 1- 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
37 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY § 5; see also, Comerford, supra note 
34 (discussing supplier’s duty to warn under the third restatement of torts). 
38 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 35, §402A (1) (A). 
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in the ‘business of selling’.39 Strict liability, however, does not apply 
to occasional sales.40 Nonetheless, a seller need not be exclusively 
engaged in selling the product category that caused injury to the 
plaintiff for liability to attach.41 
Computer software is commonly characterized as a service rather 
than a product. To date, courts have been reluctant to extend product 
liability theories to defective software.42 The Restatement (Third) of 
Torts defines a product as a ‘tangible’ property.43 In ClearCorrect 
Operating, LLC v. International Trade Commission44, the Federal 
Circuit pointed out that a digital 3D printing file (CAD) is not an 
‘article’ under the Tariff Act of 1930 because digital files are not 
“material things and thus not articles.” Software that was developed 
specifically for a customer’s needs is considered to be a service.45 The 
Restatement (Third) of Torts, however, lists electricity as an intangible 
item that qualifies as a product for the purposes of tort liability.46 
Brocklesby v. United States 47 followed a similar path, holding that an 
aeronautical chart was a defective ‘product’ under Section 402A. The 
Court in Fluor Corp. v. Jeppesen & Co. also concluded that an 
instrument approach chart was a ‘product’, and hence subject to strict 
liability.48 The Restatement (Third) of Torts, however, clearly and 
categorically excludes human tissue, even when provided 
commercially, from the scope of strict liability.49  
Here one should ask whether 3D bioprinting renders parts product 
liability obsolete, but we believe that parts of product liability are not 
necessarily obsolete. In Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons,50 the Ninth 
Circuit drew an analogy between defective computer software and 
                                                            
39 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §402A (1964). 
40 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, PRODUCT LIABILITY; see also, Comerford, supra note 34.  
41 Id. 
42 James v. Meow Media, Inc., supra note 9 at 810.  
43 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 36, § 19. 
44 ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. International Trade Com’n, 810 F.3d 1283, 1287-1294 (Fed. 
Cir. 2015).   
45 Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp, 925 F. 2d 670 (3d Cir. 1991); Data Processing Serv. v. L.H. 
Smith Oil Corp, 492 N.E.2d 314 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986). 
46 ‘When the context of their distribution and use is sufficiently analogous to the distribution and 
use of tangible personal property’. See Smith v. Homes Light, 695 P.2d (Colo. App. 1984); 
Brocklesby v. United States, 767 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1985); see also, Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s, 
938 F. 2d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 1991). The Restatement (Third) of Torts states: “Human blood and 
human tissue, even when provided commercially, are not subject to the rules of this Restatement.” 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY § 19(c) (Am. Law Inst. 1998). 
47 Brocklesby v. U.S., 767 F.2d 1288, 1295 (9th Cir. 1985). 
48 Fluor Corp. v. Jeppesen & Co., 216 Cal. Rptr. 68, 70-71 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). 
49 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 36, § 19(c). 
50 Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 1991). 
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defective products, suggesting that defective software and defective 
products might be equitable for the purpose of strict product liability.51 
Another interesting view is offered by Corley v. Stryker Corp., in which 
a single-use cutting guide was designed and manufactured from a 3D 
model of a patient’s anatomy using computer software (Class II 
medical device).52 In this case, the plaintiff’s allegation that the 
software was defective because the cutting guide that was used during 
surgery was “unreasonably dangerous in design due to the alleged 
software defects” survived a motion to dismiss. 53 
The imposition of strict liability, however, can be avoided by 
invoking the unavoidably unsafe product defense. Restatement 
(Second) of Torts §402A, comment k (1965), acknowledges that some 
products are “quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and 
ordinary use.” The seller of such products is not to be held to strict 
liability for “unfortunate consequences attending their use.” 54 This 
defense under §402A applies to ‘design defects’ rather than 
manufacturing defects; 55 it is intended to protect products that cannot 
be designed to be more safe from strict liability.56 It is not yet 
determined whether OEDs will fall within this category of unavoidably 
unsafe products.  
 
B. Designer or Manufacturer: What’s in a Name? 
 
CAD software plays an integral and vital role in the overall design 
and manufacturing of an OED. The OED design (CAD print file) plays 
                                                            
51 Id. at 1036. Where the court reasoned that: “Aeronautical charts are highly technical tools. They 
are graphic depictions of technical, mechanical data. The best analogy to an aeronautical chart is 
a compass. Both may be used to guide an individual who is engaged in an activity requiring certain 
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a key role in regulating the scaffold’s mechanical properties, cell 
growth, behavior, and differentiation.57 A sophisticated CAD print file 
almost eliminates waste of printing materials and, thus, reduces costs 
significantly.58 While materials, and processes used in OED 3D 
bioprinting can still be approved by the current regulatory system, the 
nature of the role that a CAD print file plays raises many new issues, 
the most pertinent of which is establishing who should technically take 
the title of ‘OED manufacturer’. Given the undisputed impact of the 
CAD software, should the producer of the CAD print file (CAD user) 
be considered as the manufacturer or semi-manufacturer of the OED? 
The FDA defines a manufacturer as “any person who designs, 
manufactures, fabricates, assembles, or processes a finished device.”59 
The term ‘manufacturer’ includes, but is not limited to, those who 
perform the functions of “contract sterilization, installation, relabeling, 
remanufacturing, repacking, or specification development, and initial 
distributors of foreign entities performing these functions.” 60 When 
regulating Mobile Medical Apps, the guidance document of the FDA 
provides that a Mobile Medical App manufacturer is “anyone who 
initiates specifications, designs, labels, or creates a software system or 
application for a regulated medical device in whole or from multiple 
software components.”61 Should developers who produce CAD 
software exclusively for the purpose of bioprinting OEDs, without 
engaging in the manufacturing methods, be considered manufactures 
(fabricators)? Following on from that question, how should CAD users 
who are engaged with the bioprinting process (manufacturing) be 
considered?  
It is not yet clear whether CAD developers will be subject to 
design claims under strict liability rules. As mentioned before in this 
article, computer software is generally considered to be a service rather 
                                                            
57Cho, supra note 5, at 5-2. 
58 Mathew Varkey & Anthony Atala, Organ Bio printing: A Closer Look at Ethics and Policies, 
5 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POLICY 275, 277 (2015).  
59 The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act defines a medical device as: “[A]n instrument, 
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61 FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, Mobile Medical Applications, CENTER FOR DEVICES AND 
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than a product;62 though it is possible to treat mass-marketed software 
as a product under the UCC.63      
Cases seeking compensation for damage caused by allegedly 
defective software are increasingly proceeded as breach of warranty 
under the UCC. Motorola Mobility, Inc. v. Myriad France SAS is a 
good example of a case in which it was pleaded that defective software 
constituted a breach of warranty.64 In the context of defective CAD 
print files, however, injury will most likely be suffered by non-
purchasing third parties, such as patients, rather than the healthcare 
provider that actually purchased the defective software. While the 
plaintiff might allege that their injury was caused by defective CAD 
print file design, it may be difficult to ascertain the true cause of 
injury.65 If the software is licensed, the plaintiff has the option to bring 
suit against the manufacturer of the OED designed using CAD software 
who, in turn, can seek contribution or indemnification from the CAD 
software provider under breach of warranty and other contract-based 
theories.66 An interesting question is whether a healthcare provider can 
be vicariously liable for the actions of a CAD user who fails to meet 
industry standards, even where the CAD user was acting as an 
independent contractor.67 This is particularly important given that non-
manufacturing software developers are not liable for defects in their 
software. The healthcare provider also must ensure that the CAD print 
file is properly uploaded to the bioprinting machinery and that the 
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2013 WL 5733178 (C.D. Cal. 2013). 
66 See generally, David Vladeck, Machines without Principles: Liability Rules and Artificial 
Intelligence, 89: 117 WASH. L. REV. 146 (2013). 
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bioprinting process runs correctly. Assuming that OED bioprinting can 
be supervised by a technician – the person in charge of the department 
that does the bioprinting or a physician, the healthcare provider might 
be held liable for bioprinting-related defects, since it has a duty to 
supervise the quality of the 3D bioprinting processes administered in 
its premises.  
In addition to the production of the CAD print file, the sale of 
biological and other solvable and non-solvable materials, such as 
synthetic polymers and natural polymers, is not a discrete isolated 
event in 3D bioprinting. A 3D bioprinted OED cannot sensibly be 
subject to expectations of uniformity. After all, even natural organs 
sometimes suffer catastrophic failure. Due to the complexities of the 
manufacturing and utilization process, therefore, in the absence of fault 
on part of the healthcare professional, the source of a defect in a 
bioprinted OED cannot always be traced to a single component of 
manufacture, be it the CAD print file (defective software might work 
seemingly well), the biomaterials, the bioprinting methods, or the 
advanced professional skills needed to productively bring these efforts 
together.  
Determining what is a proper test to detect a CAD software defect 
is an unresolved and contentious issue. Limited jurisprudence permits 
assertion of implied warranty against healthcare providers whenever 
there is a sale of a product under the UCC.68 In all cases, identifying 
the manufacturer is an important first step. Characterizing the CAD 
user as a manufacturer, even where the CAD print file production and 
bioprinting methods are performed by the same entity, might not be 
tenable. Due to the peculiar nature of healthcare provision, the 
overwhelming majority of courts are reluctant to abandon the 
malpractice concept and, thus, are unwilling to extend the principle of 
strict liability to healthcare providers on grounds that the “utility of and 
the need for them, involving as they do, the health and even survival of 
many people, are so important to the general welfare as to outweigh in 
the policy scale any need for the imposition on dentists and doctors of 
the rules of strict liability in tort.”69  
Measured against these principles, should the principle of 
exempting the developers of customized software from the rules of 
strict liability apply to software developers and healthcare providers 
alike? Whitehurst v. American National Red Cross provides interesting 
                                                            
68 See, e.g., M.C. Skelton v. Druid City Hosp. Bd., 459 So. 2d 818, 823 (Ala. 1984). 
69 Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 317 A.2d 392, 396 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974); See 
also Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 381 (N.J. 1984); Hoven v. Kelble, 256 N.W.2d 379, 
392 (Wis. 1977); Cafazzo v. Cent. Med. Health Servs., Inc., 668 A.2d 521, 527 (Pa. 1995). 
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insight. The plaintiff in this case sought to recover damages for injuries 
that she sustained when she contracted homologous serum hepatitis,70 
alleging that the furnishing of impure blood constituted a sale within 
the Uniform Sales Act.71 The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, 
adding that an extra charge for blood is not indicative of a sale.72 The 
court stated that administering a blood transfusion is “not a sale from 
which an action for breach of implied warranty will lie.”73 Incidental 
use of a product, such as placing a prosthesis in a patient’s mouth, does 
not constitute a ‘sale’ of a device, as required for a cause of action 
sounding in product liability.74 Hospitals, as healthcare providers, are 
not engaged in the ‘business of distributing’ products.75 One of the 
requisites, which the Restatement prescribes for the imposition of strict 
liability, the court reasoned, is that “the seller is engaged in the business 
of selling such product.”76 Hospitals are not subject to strict liability 
for “latently defective product[s] supplied . . . by another for . . . use in 
rendering treatment.”77 With the above descriptions in mind, two 
important issues must be considered. First, it seems that the production 
of a CAD print file by a healthcare provider constitutes the 
performance of a medical ‘service’.78 Does it follow, however, that the 
performance of such a service by a healthcare provider categorically 
does not give rise to an action for breach of warranty? If so, who bears 
liability for claimed defects in a CAD print file that was made 
exclusively under the control of a healthcare provider and used in 
clinical procedures within its premises? The answers to these questions 
rest, among other issues, on the level of personalization by the CAD 
user that is needed to create a CAD print file, which is used by a 
manufacturer, to bioprint an OED. A personalized CAD print file is 
unlikely to be subject to strict liability rules.     
The personalization of OED bioprinting clearly blurs the line 
between the principles of negligence and strict liability. In this context, 
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it is the hospital, (healthcare provider) that is likely to handle most of 
the bioprinting process, including the CAD print file production.  
 
C. To Regulate or Not to Regulate? 
 
The complexity of using CAD software for 3D bioprinting is 
likely to place a strain on the current infrastructure of software 
development regulation. Agency theory teaches us that, although 
certain innovations can disrupt existing industries, traditional 
rulemaking and adjudication are, nonetheless, not the best answer to 
face this disruption.79 Tim Wu argues that ‘threats’, when posed in 
guidance documents, are a more suitable means of seeking to avoid 
premature regulation than poorly formed or premature laws.80 In 
essence, fears regarding economic growth and regulation compliance 
might ultimately be the most effective means to persuade healthcare 
providers to adopt a ‘workable’, albeit incoherent, up-to-date quality 
design. A recent study conducted by the FDA revealed that compliance 
with medical regulations does not necessarily ensure the highest 
possible quality of final health outcome for the patient.81 Similarly, 
having well-formed legal/technical definitions in the design documents 
of source code of the CAD software does not necessarily guarantee 
fault-free software; defective CAD software can sometimes result from 
sound technical definitions in the CAD source code.82 While clear 
industry standards would help in early identification of potential coding 
defects,83 it is unusually challenging for a government agency to be 
sufficiently omniscient to be able to predict scenarios that may require 
legal attention in advanced technology industries such as 3D 
bioprinting.    
Despite its advantages described above, a ‘threats’ policy brings 
the risk of suboptimal long-term regulation;84 the software-based 
medical device industry is a notable example. For almost three decades, 
the FDA has struggled to develop a comprehensive regulatory initiative 
for innovative medical products.85 A prominent example is the Therac-
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25 incident in 1986-87, which led to a number of legislative and 
regulatory initiatives.86 Following this incident, in 1987 the FDA 
published its Draft Policy Guidance for the Regulation of Computer 
Products.87 Despite the growing and critical role of software in patient 
safety, the FDA never finalized their draft guidance, thus failing to 
transform it into a long term strategy; the draft guidance was finally 
abandoned, 18 years later, in 2005.88 In 2013, the FDA published 
another guidance document that this time addressed issues related to 
software devices embodied in smartphones.89 Thus, the FDA’s 
‘threats’ policy has been used as a long-term strategy to address 
software-related issues in the medical field,90 partially replacing 
rulemaking and adjudication. Given the highly uncertain nature of 
software innovations and the associated risks of embarking on 
premature regulatory exercises, the FDA’s conventional wisdom has 
been to rely on guidance documents rather than decisive regulation.91 
The FDA continues on this path despite the ever-increasing number of 
critical safety incidents that involve software defects, with as many as 
a few hundred patients injured in radiation incidents that were caused 
by either software or user error, just as happened in the Therac-25 case 
around thirty years ago.92 
There is no reason to believe that the FDA’s regulatory approach 
to OED manufacturing and use will be any different to that taken for 
software in general. The FDA is likely to rely on its tentative, short-
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term approach and publish a number of draft guidance documents to 
regulate CAD software in the 3D bioprinting field; these documents 
will likely be used, by default, in the long-term, ultimately leading to 
suboptimal regulation for this emerging industry.93 The public interest 
in human healthcare demands, however, that regulators maintain their 
efforts in the face of disruptive 3D biotechnologies. While avoiding 
technological initiatives that would discourage innovation in this field 
is paramount, some kind of regulatory intervention is also needed, 
particularly for industries in which consumers cannot themselves 
assess quality by personal inspection or experience. 
II. RETHINKING SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT LIABILITY 
The following proposal seeks to leverage the legal developments 
in the fields of 3D bioprinting of OEDs and product liability in order 
to improve the U.S.’s approach to the regulation of software design in 
the medical sector. The proposal remains committed to the policy 
decisions underlying the U.S. healthcare system while offering many 
benefits to patients. Furthermore, it will lead to improved predictability 
and lower costs for all involved parties, and minimize the incentive for 
producing defective software. 
A. The Need to Abandon the Products/Services Dichotomy 
This section investigates the viability of adopting a policy-based 
approach to determine whether the development of CAD software 
deserves the protection of strict product lability. In a series of cases in 
the U.S., a common law doctrine of strict liability in the medical field 
has been developed. According to this series of cases, it is possible to 
extend the scope of strict liability to certain pre-determined aspects of 
CAD development. Under this approach, however, courts should be 
willing to look beyond the traditional products/services dichotomy that 
has, so far, shielded software development against strict liability law.  
Clay v. Yates was the first case to examine mixed sales-services 
transactions, albeit outside the context of 3D bioprinting.94. This case 
involved labor as well as the necessary ‘incidental’ use of cloth and 
paper, both of which would be incorporated in the final product: a book. 
In this context, the court approached the interface between products 
                                                            
93 See, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Regulatory Considerations for 
Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and Tissue Based Products, FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION (2017) 
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and services by pointing out that “the true criterion is, whether work is 
the essence of the contract, or whether it is the materials supplied.”95  
A more contemporary interpretation of this principle was 
provided by the Eighth Circuit in Bonebrake v. Cox.96 Here, the 
predominant factor test was framed in the following manner:  
The test for inclusion or exclusion is not whether [products 
and services] are mixed, but… whether their predominant 
factor, their thrust, their purposes,… is the rendition of 
services, with products incidentally involved… or is a 
transaction of sale, with labor incidentally involved.97  
This significant policy-based statement, that a mixed transaction 
should be assessed in its ‘essence’, could have a potent implication in 
the CAD print file production process. More specifically, courts and 
legislators will have to determine what is the essential quality of the 
bioprinted organ: the CAD print file, bioprinting materials, bioprinting 
methods, or some combination of the three. 
In Greenberg v. Michael Reese Hospital, the court noted that it is 
a “distortion to take what is a sale and turn it into a service, perhaps to 
reach the desired result.”98 The court stated that “[i]n cases involving 
products and other tangible physical materials which are in some way 
bad, imposition of liability unquestionably enhances the public interest 
in human life and health.”99  
In Johnson v. Sears,100 a Wisconsin federal district court 
unequivocally rejected the technical and artificial products/services 
distinction as a basis for not imposing strict liability rules on hospitals 
for the services they provide; the court stated that hospitals could be 
held strictly liable for the ‘administrative rather than professional’ 
services they render. 101 How to best distinguish between professional 
medical and administrative services, however, remains to be 
determined; this is a distinction that should be made on an ad hoc 
basis.102 The New Jersey Supreme Court also held that “the distinction 
between a sale and the rendition of services is a highly artificial 
one.”103 A similar conclusion was reached in Hoffman v. Misericordia 
Hospital of Philadelphia, where the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
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contended that it did “not feel obligated to hinge any resolution of the 
very important issue… raised [in this case] on the technical existence 
of a sale.”104 Before that, the court in Cunningham v. MacNeal 
Memorial Hospital also held that a hospital could be held strictly liable 
for provision of contaminated blood.105    
Differentiating between products and services for the purposes of 
product liability requires a policy-based test. In Lowrie v. City of 
Evanston106, the court stressed that the policy reasons underlying 
“product liability .  .  .  should be considered in determining whether 
something is a product  .  .  .  rather than . . . the dictionary definition 
of the word.”107 When determining whether something constitutes a 
product for purposes of strict lability, the following policy reasons 
should be considered: (i) the public interest in human life and health,108 
(ii) the invitations and solicitations of the manufacturer to purchase the 
product,109 (iii) the justice of imposing a loss on a manufacturer who 
created a risk and reaped a profit,110 and (iv) the superior ability of the 
commercial enterprise to distribute the risk of injury proximately 
caused by the defective condition of its product by passing the loss onto 
the public as a cost of doing business.111  
This interpretation is in accordance with the Restatement (Third) 
of Tort, which does not seem to discard such a possibility. When 
considering the case of Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons in relation to the 
use of computer software, it would appear that the reporters were 
leaning towards extending strict lability to software, pointing out that: 
“When a court will have to decide whether to extend strict liability to 
computer software, it may draw an analogy between the treatment of 
software under the UCC and under product liability law.”112  
The Restatement (Third) provides that, even when provided 
commercially, services are not products.113 Personalized software-
based products, biological tissues, biological materials and human 
organs are not considered products for the purposes of strict lability. 
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The provision of a software-based product that is created at the request 
of a specific patient, such as a CAD print file, is likely to be considered 
as a service provision. In this context, customization means developing 
software whose output is a software-based product for use by a single 
or a small group of individuals. In the 3D bioprinting field, therefore, 
the fate of defective CAD print files rests, among others, on two 
dominant factors: (i) the level of customization required to fit a 
patient’s specific needs; and (ii) the identity of the CAD user. 
B. Against Extending Strict Liability Rules to Defective CAD 
Print Files 
This section raises the question of whether imposing strict 
liability, rather than negligence, on facilities that produce defective 
CAD print files is an efficient method to force CAD developers (in the 
field of OED fabrication) to produce defective CAD software. 
The theory of strict liability is based upon many economic policy 
considerations.114 Most jurisprudences refrain from applying strict 
product liability to software developers and medical professionals; 
traditionally, medical professionals have only been liable for negligent 
conduct. Apart from a few exceptions, courts in the U.S. have followed 
Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital 115 by exempting blood products 
from the scope of strict liability. Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial 
Hospital, however, rejected Perlmutter’s interpretation and held that a 
hospital could be held strictly liable for providing a patient with 
contaminated blood.116 This ruling led subsequently to the passing in 
the U.S. of the so-called ‘blood shield statutes’ in which both warranty 
and strict liability are inapplicable to blood transfusions. In accordance 
with this approach, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated that providing 
medical services should not be equated with the task of selling 
products: “Medical and many other professional services tend often to 
be experimental in nature, depending on factors beyond the control of 
the professional, and devoid of certainty or assurance or result. Medical 
services are an absolute necessity to society, and they must be readily 
available to the people.”117      
Health care facilities are precluded from the scope of strict 
liability for defective medical implants used within their premises for 
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good reason; with Cafazzo v. Central Medical Health Services, Inc118 
and Hoff v. Zimmer, Inc119 being just two of many notable examples of 
such reasoning. Imposing strict liability on healthcare-related services 
will increase the costs of providing those services and hamper progress 
in developing new treatments and interventional techniques, thus 
risking them becoming unaffordable to many patients.120 Policy 
considerations that favor the application of the strict liability doctrine 
on CAD software could be significantly undermined and outweighed 
by the need for ready accessibility of essential healthcare services.121 
These two arguments are, however, rebuttable.122 Analogously, 
essential products, such as pharmaceuticals, are subject to strict 
liability. Categorically exempting medical software development from 
the scope of strict liability can only be justified where doing so would 
discourage software developers from doing their jobs well, or where 
the price of medical services would increase.123 Both of these 
assumptions are yet to be substantiated quantitatively. 
To summarize, applying stringent strict liability as a theory of 
recovery in the software development setting might be 
counterproductive. Under such a scenario, CAD developers might be 
more willing to produce safe, yet not quite effective, software. In the 
words of the Supreme Court of the United States: “State tort law that 
requires a manufacturer's catheters to be safer, but hence less effective, 
than the model the FDA has approved disrupts the federal scheme no 
less than state regulatory law to the same effect.”124 The Court stressed 
that a cost-benefit analysis should be conducted to determine, for 
example, how many more lives will be saved by a device which, along 
with its greater effectiveness, brings a greater risk of harm.125 
C. The Need for a Third Approach? 
Conventional OED bioprinting involves a vast array of materials, 
services, and products, often used in combination; examples include 
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services by healthcare professionals, bio-ink, human tissue, biological 
and non-biological materials, bioprinters, imaging facilities, patient 
image data, and highly specialized CAD software, which is the focus 
of this article. Can a healthcare provider be held liable for producing 
defective CAD print files for use in 3D bioprinting? Common wisdom 
and virtually unanimous holding of the courts is that defective CAD 
software and CAD print files that are produced by a healthcare provider 
are typically beyond the scope of strict liability.126 Here, one should ask 
if a defective CAD print file supplied by a non-manufacturing entity 
falls under the scope of strict liability. In this context, a distinction must 
be made between standardized and personalized CAD print file 
production. There might be room for advancing strict lability claims 
against the producer of standardized CAD print files under the UCC. 
However, customized CAD print files are typically exempt from the 
scope of strict liability, even when sold commercially.127 If the 
producer of the defective CAD print file and the manufacturer of the 
OED are not the same entity, the distributor of the defective CAD 
software might also be exempted from strict liability. Conventional 
wisdom dictates that a ‘non-manufacturing’ seller or licensor of a 
defective product is not strictly liable for harm caused by that defective 
product.128       
The only viable remaining option is recovery based upon the 
theory of malpractice.129 Under negligence claims, four conditions 
must all be met: duty of care, breach of duty, causation, and damages. 
Here it is useful to ask whether the developer of CAD software used to 
bioprint the OED should have a duty of care towards a specific patient. 
It is possible that they should have a duty of care provided that two 
conditions are met: (1) the patient suffers economic injury,130 and (2) 
the CAD developer and the fabricator of the OED are the same 
individuals/entity.131 This creates a new problem: while the 
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manufacturer of a conventional product has a legal duty to use 
‘reasonable care’ to mitigate foreseeable risks of injury to others, it is 
unusually difficult for the CAD developer to predict all of the 
‘reasonable dangers’ associated with the use of the OED, or to predict 
the ‘unreasonable dangers’ for which they owe a duty to warn. In this 
context, setting an industry standard of care is unusually difficult; the 
full risks and benefits may not become apparent for many years. It is 
not currently clear if it is tenable to impose a strict standard of care on 
OED design and development processes in order to mitigate against the 
manufacture of intrinsically dangerous OEDs. This lack of clarity is 
due to the heavy burden of proof that is needed to demonstrate that 
OED’s defects are attributable to negligence under traditional theories 
of negligence. It is confounded by the large number of different 
hypotheses, information, and conflicting literature.132 To complicate 
this issue further, the benefits of the elaborate safety precautions that 
are incorporated into CAD development may or may not always 
outweigh the inhibiting effects on innovation, let alone the human cost 
and development delay. 
Satisfying the high threshold requirement of causation could 
constitute an exceptionally challenging legal hurdle. Latent design or 
bioprinting defects could take weeks, months or years to negatively 
impact patient health. This issue is complicated by the fact that it is not 
always possible to associate organ failure with bioprinting methods 
(manufacture), defective CAD software, or defective biomaterials.  
For these reasons, the complexities of proving causation and 
negligent conduct in 3D bioprinting design defect cases could be 
powerful disincentives to pursuing a claim. The limits of clinical trials 
in predicting adverse effects over time are a potent factor that further 
complicates the process of establishing negligence. The use of 3D 
bioprinted organs introduces unique challenges that severely limit the 
potential to undertake clinical trials. For example, it is difficult to 
perform a randomized clinical trial on patients who have received 
personalized OEDs since each OED is designed to treat the specific 
clinical circumstances of only that single patient; this makes it difficult 
to provide a reliable control group. Furthermore, inconsistent evidence 
standards applied to conventional medical devices, along with diverse 
regulatory standards, could inadvertently introduce avoidable risks to 
patients in need of 3D bioprinted organs. Such an unpredictable 
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environment also sends strong disincentives to investors in this 
emerging field. The general medical condition of the patient in need of 
a bioprinted OED can pose acute evidential difficulties. So, too, can 
uncertainty over the appropriate defendant(s), be it the CAD user, the 
physician(s) monitoring the bioprinting methods, the healthcare 
provider responsible for bioprinting the organ or a combination of these 
individuals/entities. 
III. MOVING FORWARD: AN AD HOC APPROACH TO EXTEND THE 
LIABILITY OF DEFECTIVE CAD DESIGN 
Neither strict nor negligence theories of liability seem to properly 
fit the needs of the OED software. Applying a stringent strict liability 
to CAD design and development processes can lead CAD developers 
to deploy safe, but not necessarily effective, software. Proving 
professional negligence, on the other hand, is likely to be an unusually 
strenuous legal process. For these reasons,  this article proposes a third 
policy-based approach as a basis for imposing liability on the 
developers of defective CAD software.133 Under this approach, instead 
of making the artificial distinction between products/services, liability 
rules ought to be based on whether the step performed or service 
rendered is administrative/technical or professional (a purely medical 
service).134  Only administrative and technical services should to be 
subject to strict liability rules. The distinction between professional and 
non-professional (administrative and technical) services is a 
consideration that should be made on an ad hoc basis. The next section 
will use a set of economic and technical justifications to make the case 
for this ad hoc approach. 
A. Economic Considerations 
The rationale of economic efficiency is frequently used to justify 
the imposition of strict liability.135  It is believed that, once identified, 
liability should be placed on the party that was most capable of 
preventing the defect in the first place. In Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling 
Co.,136 in his concurring opinion, Justice Traynor outlined this 
economic rationale, pointing out that “even if there is no negligence, 
however, public policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever 
it well most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in 
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defective products that reach the market.”137 Reducing the defect rate 
to an acceptable level, therefore, necessitates two interrelated 
requirements: (1) identification of a cost-effective action that can be 
used to prevent the defect and (2) identification of the party that was 
most ‘effectively capable of preventing’ the defect in the first place.138 
In other words, the party with the greatest control and knowledge of 
the product should bear ultimate responsibility for its defects.  
Since software defects originate from the development process,139 
it is perhaps logical to focus our attention on the design and 
development stages of CAD software. From a policy standpoint, it is 
100 times cheaper to correct software defects early rather than late in 
the development lifecycle,140 irrespective of the potential cost of 
human harm or even death. From this perspective, adequate penalties 
should be imposed on CAD developers in the hope that this will deter 
serious misconduct more effectively than imposing a fault-based 
system, provided that two conditions are met: (1) there is an 
unacceptably high incidence of defective CAD software development, 
and (2) there are economically viable penalties for developing 
defective CAD software available.     
Under this welfare argument, an acceptable reason to extend strict 
liability to the ‘administrative/technical’ aspects of CAD software 
development is that the developer is in an enormously strong position 
to cost-effectively discourage the development of defective software. 
The position of the developer is so strong that a commercial software 
development company can realistically discourage the production of 
defective software at relatively low cost. Strict lability law could serve 
its many goals by extending its scope to administrative/technical design 
as well as the development of CAD software in the 3D bioprinting 
field. In contrast, if the cost of extending strict liability to these steps 
were to be unacceptably high, or where doing so would sustainably 
restrict access to affordable healthcare in other ways, other reward 
approaches should be considered. 
B. Technical Considerations 
Software power is ubiquitous. The use of advanced software today 
extends into the medical field and impacts on our daily health, with 
OEDs being an excellent example. The consequences of using 
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defective software in the medical field can be far reaching, especially 
in cases where patients suffer real physical harm. As demonstrated by 
the experience of the North American Space Agency (NASA) on July 
22, 1962, a small coding error can lead to serious consequences- a 
missing hyphen, among other reasons, led the Mariner spacecraft to 
spin wildly out of control.141 In fact, defective software development 
is the single most important for software failure. Currently, a host of 
software defect mitigation methods are implemented; of particular 
interest are software verification and validation methods.142 In the 
context of OED manufacture, software verification focuses on 
providing ‘objective evidence’ that the design outputs of a particular 
piece of CAD software meets all specified requirements for proper 
OED bioprinting, ensuring consistency, completeness, and correctness 
of the bioprinting methods. In contrast, software validation focusses on 
examination and provision of objective evidence that the final 
bioprinted OED meets patient requirements and expectations. Software 
validation goes beyond mere software testing to address issues related 
to best engineering practices, software development, and testing. 143  
A significant and likely challenge in the field of OED bioprinting 
will be to establish how much ‘evidence’ is required to verify and 
validate CAD software whose output is a CAD print file for use in OED 
manufactureing. The complexity of a validation system for CAD 
software of this nature should be commensurate with the risk posed to 
the patient by automated bioprinting, in addition to the risks imposed 
by other factors, such as the use of synthetic and organic material. 
Ultimately, the quality of a 3D bioprinted OED is strongly dependent 
on the complexity of the CAD software, the CAD print file design, and 
bioprinting methods (manufacture).   
An interesting question is whether mathematical modeling used 
to optimize the print file and predictions before bioprinting should be 
accepted as ‘documented evidence’ that the manufactured OED is 
likely to ‘consistently lead to the expected results’ and, thus, comply 
with relevant regulations. This is important for two reasons: (1) 3D 
bioprinting relies on mathematical modeling to optimize CAD print file 
design before bioprinting;144 and (2) a significant number of medical 
                                                            
141 NSSDC Master Catalog: Spacecraft, Mariner 1, NATIONAL SPACE SCIENCE DATA CENTER, 
(last accessed March 31, 2019) 
https://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/nmc/spacecraft/display.action?id=MARIN1.   
142 For more information about software validation in general, see CENTER FOR DEVICES AND 
RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, General Principle of Software Validation, FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION  6 (Jan. 11, 2002).   
143 For general information about software validation, see Vogel, supra note 12, at 31.   
144 Fabien Guillemot, Vladimir Mironov & Makoto Nakamura, Bioprinting is coming of age, 2 
64 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.  [Vol. 35 
device recalls in the U.S. are due to defective software.145 In fact, more 
than 50 percent of all medical device recalls are reportedly due to 
failures in product design and manufacturing process control.146 This 
issue is likely to become even more acute given the critical role of CAD 
software in 3D bioprinting.    
In 3D bioprinting, CAD software validation requirements should 
reflect the stated or implied needs of the patient receiving the OED. In 
this respect, testing that uses only mathematical modeling is unlikely 
to satisfy the full validation requirements. The overwhelming majority 
of software cannot be fully tested for every potential pathway 
combination through the source code.147 It follows, therefore, that not 
all 3D bioprinting CAD software defects can be fully tested for every 
potential pathway combination through the source code. For this 
reason, a combination of other 3D bioprinting-related verification 
techniques that take into consideration the OED development 
environment, the application, and the risk to patients are likely required 
to ensure comprehensive validation. This is extremely important given 
that software defects usually occur without warning, where latent 
defects may be hidden until long after the software is reached in the 
market.148  
C. Why CAD Print File? 
A scientist or medical device engineer commences the analysis of 
software-based medical devices with a statement of the following 
nature: “I don’t trust software…software -any software- is probably 
going to fail in some way when I use it, and probably when I need it 
most. I’m rarely disappointed in that regard.”149 Software development 
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for medical devices is more technically demanding than software 
development for consumer electronics150 since the frequently short 
lifecycle of consumer electronics often allows consumer acceptance of 
lower standards of software robustness.  
The important function of CAD software lends it an indisputably 
specific character. It is challenging to determine whether an OED-
related injury is caused by either defective CAD software or bioprinting 
hardware. It is not clear whether it would be possible to accept that a 
bioprinted OED defect was caused by defective CAD software without 
establishing that the same CAD software used to bioprint an OED for 
person A (without defect) also resulted in the defect of which person B 
complains. This raises the pivotal question of when, if at all, an 
implantable OED can be regarded to be defective when it does not 
belong to a group that has a proven and significant risk of failure, or in 
which a significant number of examples of the same model product 
have been defective, as is the case when assessing defects in 
conventional medical devices. This is why the concept of defective 
software is fundamental to the application of specific rules governing 
strict liability to a pre-determined administrative/technical aspect of 
CAD software development. In cases whereby defective CAD 
software causes patient injury, and where it is unreasonably 
challenging to attribute fault to a particular party, forming a response 
that best serves the collective interests of all affected stakeholders is an 
important first step. Under the malpractice regime, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to satisfy the high legal threshold that a physician failed to 
comply with the local standard of care, or that the CAD software was 
defective. For example, a patient would have to demonstrate that 
defective CAD software would benefit from incremental modifications 
that would improve the quality of the final 3D bioprinted OED, and 
that the value of the resultant improvements to patient health would be 
equal to, or more than, the added cost of the modified CAD software; 
this requires a quantifiable economic to be placed on patient health. 
Furthermore, it would be unusually challenging to prove that the 
suggested improvement to the CAD software would, in reality, yield 
the expected improvement to patient health. Here, the patient would 
need to employ an expert software developer to demonstrate that the 
improved software is technologically feasible.    
It is fair to argue and even to assume that the safety and efficacy 
of CAD software that is used in OED manufacturing is paramount to 
patient health, and it should outweigh time-to-market considerations. 
However, despite the already heavy regulation of invasive medical 
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devices, where regulatory oversight covers the development stages as 
well as the final product, safety and efficacy are sometimes influenced 
by other pertinent factors. Ideally, OED manufacture requires 
reasonably lengthy and onerous evaluation to ensure safety, quality, 
and effectiveness; this is unlikely to be well received by the 3D 
bioprinting industry. Lengthy evaluation shortens the most lucrative 
period for a heavily patented industry; although granted U.S. patents 
have a 20 year term in the case of devices (supplementary protection 
certificates however are available for some pharmaceuticals and 
agrochemical),151 methods, or printing methods, the period during 
which a 3D bioprinted invention can be marketed is normally much 
shorter, due to the lengthy development period. Enforcing rigorous 
safety standards takes valuable time and, thus, risks compromising the 
economic value of the patented product. For these reasons, it is likely 
that the 3D bioprinting industry will push hard to obtain shorter review 
times and decreased administrative requirements for individually 
licensed OEDs.152 Furthermore, broader policy issues are raised by 
commercial priorities, as well as the extent to which the private sector 
controls research, production, and marketing of 3D bioprinted OEDs. 
As already mentioned, the use of 3D bioprinted OEDs introduces 
challenges that render randomized controlled clinical trials difficult 
due to the inherent personalization of each individual OED. The 
unavoidably commercial incentives might encourage CAD developers 
to end software testing prematurely at the detriment of patient 
wellbeing. For these reasons, the formation of a system of strict 
liability, completely uncoupled from notions of fault or malpractice, 
for a selected group of administrative and technical CAD development 
steps is desirable. 
CONCLUSION 
Cadaveric donors are currently the main source of human 
transplant organs.153 With the exception of cornea transplantations, 
transplant timing is critically tight; for example, donor hearts and lungs 
are viable for transplantation for fewer than six hours.154 Alternative 
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options to whole organ transplants include the possibility of 
transplanting cells directly into the target area to replace damaged 
tissue; this option is currently problematic due to the often high rate of 
transplanted cell death, which can be as high 50-90 percent in cases of 
ischemic cardiac disease cell transplant. Indeed, more than 90 percent 
of transplanted cells usually die within one week of transplantation for 
a number of reasons.155 In this context, 3D bioprinted OED implants 
might be regarded as a cure when conventional therapies have failed, 
are unavailable, or are unsuitable. Thus, it is important that the growth 
of innovative 3D bioprinting is encouraged.  
Effective 3D OED bioprinting offers the promise of bridging the 
current shortage of donor organs, thus enhancing patient quality of 
care. Creating a streamlined approach to assessing the requirements of 
effective, reliable, and high-quality CAD software is an important first 
step.     
This article concludes by suggesting a potentially promising 
approach for addressing the liability challenge for defective CAD 
software in the context of 3D bioprinted OEDs. The proposed solution 
would enable the public to bring tort actions against CAD developers. 
To allow a claim however, courts should move beyond the superficial 
differentiation of products and services; courts must allow stakeholders 
to use the potential of tort law effectively and, equally importantly, to 
curb the introduction of defective CAD software. Furthermore, a new 
test for setting the boundaries and limits of strict liability in the field of 
OED bioprinting is proposed. The strict liability regime offers several 
advantages relative to negligence and/or malpractice regimes, which 
can be utilized to enhance patient safety. The proposed approach avoids 
the nearly impossible task of proving a breach in standard of care, 
allowing stakeholders to benefit from clearer and lower evidentiary 
standards. Equally significant, the cost factor of our proposal does not, 
in principle, lead to an overreliance on technology, which would risk 
defective outcomes or a reduction in the creation of would-be optimal 
solutions. 
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